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Introduction:
The campaign for war
Newspaper reporting of the Gulf War Two in Australia was with some exceptions
woefully derelict, in the United States, Rupert Murdoch’s Fox cable television
network led the charge for patriotic journalism. Murdoch does not own a
television station in Australia, but he does own the only nationally circulating
daily newspaper as well as several tabloids in major centres and Brisbane’s
‘broadloid’, the Courier-Mail.
From the start, Murdoch’s Australian was firmly committed to the coalition of
the willing and provided a well-orchestrated cheer squad for Prime Minister John
Howard and the war against Iraq. This approach by the Murdoch press was not
surprising; it is consistent with the ‘national interest’ frame that this
multinational media conglomerate places over almost everything it does.
Just a week out from the start of combat operations, the Australian was
reporting the mad scramble by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair to pull
something out of the public relations disaster of the United Nations (UN). Blair
was described as ‘bleeding politically’ while the White House was claiming that
any vote by the Security Council to support war would be a ‘moral victory’, with
or without a veto by China, Russia or France. A report from USA Today that the
US was threatening to withdraw aid to recalcitrant Latin American nations
unless they supported the war, was buried in the last par of 16 (Lusetich 2003a).
John Howard’s twenty minute phone conversation was the second lead on 13
March and reported that Australian diplomats were ‘frantically lobbying’ at the
UN on behalf of the coalition (Shanahan 2003c). This story was reinforced by a
UN ‘scorecard’ on page 8 outlining how former colonies of France and the US
were being pressured over their crucial Security Council vote (Sutherland 2003a).
At the same time, a reprint from the London Times was headlined: ‘Chirac’s
defiance earns national hero status’ (Bremner 2003a).
Pre-war: open debate about the issues
In a remarkable and dramatic fashion a senior officer with the spy agency, the
Office of National Assessments (ONA), Andrew Wilkie, resigned his post a week
before the fighting started. Wilkie cited his disagreements with ONA over their
threat assessment of Iraq. He appeared all over the media for a couple of days
and spoke at an anti-war rally in Canberra. Despite official attempts to discredit
him, Wilkie stuck to his guns (as it were) and denounced the Government’s
decision to join the war:
I have been following the flow of intelligence very closely and, as far as I am
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I have been following the flow of intelligence very closely and, as far as I am
concerned, I have seen nothing that justifies a war against them. (Andrew Wilkie
quoted in McIlveen 2003a)
At this point, about one week out from the fighting, the news media including the
Australian was still asking the ‘Why?’ questions about the war, as well as the
‘What?’ questions. In the minds of the great majority of Australians many
questions had not yet been satisfactorily answered.
The United Nations and human rights: The fundamental question about
the validity of the war, with or without UN approval was not yet resolved.
Large numbers of people were yet to be convinced that the war to bring
‘Western-style’ democracy to Iraq was morally correct.
Weapons of mass destruction: Did Iraq really possess chemical and
biological weapons? There was by no means a clear answer to this question
and many were sceptical of the so-called ‘evidence’ presented by the British
and American governments. Their attempts to justify the attack on the
grounds of possible WMDs did not appear to be working well at this point.
Regime change: Like the question of the UN and human rights, the
fundamental issue of whether ‘regime change’ was a permissive sanction of
the war was not resolved in favour of the military alliance.
Oil and other economic issues: Questions about the impact of the war and
its inevitable aftermath were still not settled. The oil producing nations were
split through their council, OPEC. Many Arab nations did not want to be
seen to endorse the attack against Iraq, but still wanted to benefit from the
global trade in oil (AP 2003a).
Imperialism, Empire-building: Of course, this issue was never discussed too
openly or too frequently in the media, in Australia or anywhere much in
the English-speaking world, but occasionally a small piece of information
got through. A week before the fighting, a short Agence France Presse
report was published in the Australian, ‘Before the fight, the contracts’. This
wire story reported without comment a ‘lucrative contract’ awarded before
the allies had ‘set foot in Iraq’ and casually mentioned ‘a 13-page “Vision for
Post Conflict Iraq” document that had been circulated to a number of US
companies’ (AFP 2003a). The anti-war bloggers were circulating this type
of material often before the wire services.
Terrorism: September 11 and the Bali bombing: The Bali bombing incident
in October 2002 was a key political issue in Australia and a cultural shock
to many. In a sense, it functioned as a psychological and emotional link to
September 11 in the United States. Despite this strong cultural and
ideological link, the Australian Government found it hard to convince
public opinion that the Bali bomb deaths justified an attack on Iraq.
Links to Al-Qaeda: As he did with the Bali bombing, the Australian Prime
Minister tried hard to make the connection between Iraq and terrorism,
constantly backing up the British and American statements on this issue.
The ‘terror alert’ situation in Australia was ramped up in the week before
the war. John Howard’s quickly arranged appearance at the National Press
Club was even more hastily shifted into the secure compound of Parliament
House behind a cordon of security and anti-protest barriers. Of course, the
corollary was that when a small group of angry protestors actually tried to
get into Parliament House, normally a public building, the police and
guards were able to arrange a ‘scuffle’ and a couple of arrests for the
cameras. Despite the lack of evidence of any links between Iraq and Osama
bin Laden, the security and terrorism threat was a key element of the
psychological preparation of public opinion.
Allies under pressure
Murdoch’s Australian newspapers enjoy a close relationship with other
mastheads in his international stable. During the conflict, this was a convenient
way of filling space in the extended coverage of a crisis such as Gulf War Two. In
an Australian column (13 March), lifted from the Times, Simon Jenkins (2003a)
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outlined the ‘paradox’ of Tony Blair: a British Labour Prime Minister ‘leading
Britain firmly into the embrace of Washington’, while simultaneously being
‘where no wise statesman should ever be – up a creek without a paddle.’ Jenkins
referred to the then beleaguered British Prime Minister as ‘Tony Blur’ and implied
he might not survive much longer in power. On the same page was a large
Reuter’s photo of Blair looking haggard and glum. The lead on this page was the
‘gravest crisis’ of Blair’s career (Reuter’s 2003a) as his support in the opinion polls
tumbled.
If before the fighting started the news pages of the Murdoch press appeared to
express some divergent ‘news’ analysis of events, the leader pages could be relied
upon to put the founder’s position in a loyal and succinct kind of way. The
editorial, ‘French toast irrelevant UN’ makes it clear that the Australian regarded
Chirac as a faded power living an ‘impossible dream’ while, arguments at the UN
were ‘less weak than feeble’. France, the editorial warned, could be accused of
reducing ‘global politics to a competition between great powers in which a
nationalist France cannot compete’ (Australian 2003b). At least the paper was
consistent in October 2002, when an editorial appeared arguing that the UN
must take a tough stand against Iraq (Australian 2002). However, the debate
about UN relevance and US unilateralism was not easily won, and this was
reflected in letters to the editor. The Australian (13 March 2003) printed four
long letters about these issues and one about the real reasons behind the war: oil,
revenge, the US defence budget, ideology and fanaticism (Walbran 2003). Even
at the beginning of the war, questions about the UN continued to be raised. Roy
Eccleston argued that the UN had been ‘shoved aside’ by the US, but that the
organisation would maintain its relevance after the conflict, despite the bitterness
and splits over Iraq (Eccleston 2003b).
As usual, the Australian‘s chorus of support for the Australian government was
led by the very conservative and pro-Howard Foreign editor Greg Sheridan. On
13 March, Sheridan resolutely defended the morality of the war in the face of an
‘unreasonable veto’ by one of the non-permanent Security Council members.
Sheridan described the debate as ‘emotional and irrational’ and ‘hysterical’ and he
then restated all the well-rehearsed lines defending the morality of an attack on
Iraq (Sheridan 2003a). Sheridan also cheered on the psychological operations of
the Americans, in particular ‘Shock and Awe’, which he described as a ‘dislocation
operation directed at the Iraqi leadership’ (Sheridan 2003b). To be fair, Sheridan’s
support for the war was tempered by two other opinion pieces on the same day
(22 March). Washington-based ‘commentator’ and author of Shock and Awe,
Harlan Ullman, argued that US unilateralism might have profound implications
for the world geopolitical situation well into the future (Ullman 2003a). On the
same page, Professor Paul Dibb, a respected Australian commentator on defence
issues, suggested that a ‘likely outcome’ of the war was ‘a world divided and a
return to the essentially tragic history of international affairs’ (Dibb 2003a).
An Australian interest?
Australian public opinion is sensitive to perceptions that its government might be
accused of being a junior partner in America’s imperial ambition. This has deep
historic and cultural roots in Australia’s colonial past and the post-war reliance
on America. There is still a memory of Australia’s participation in Vietnam,
summed up by the famous phrase of an otherwise forgettable Prime Minister,
Harold Holt. On the occasion of Johnson’s visit to Australia in 1966, Holt told the
US President that Australia would go ‘all the way with LBJ’. Holt’s political
successor, John Howard, did not want to be seen in this unflattering light. It was
therefore important that his government establish an ‘independent’ rationale for
supporting GWB’s war against Iraq.
A week before the fighting began, the Australian‘s National Security editor,
Patrick Walters, (2003b) reported negative comments about the unilateral
approach of the US. The local angle on this piece was François Heisburg’s
comment that Australia could no longer rely on the ANZUS alliance. The nature
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of Australia’s security relationship with the United States was an important
domestic issue: was Australia just a ‘loyal deputy’, or was there a ‘national
interest’ involved in the Government’s support for Washington? The Australian
clearly believed that the war against Iraq was justified and that Australia had a
strong national interest in participating. National affairs editor Mike Steketee
argued this point in a counter-intuitive fashion on the first weekend of war:
Don’t accept for one moment the propaganda that Australia is a lickspittle of the
US. Sometimes we get quite upset with the Americans. (Steketee 2003a)
The ‘propaganda’ Steketee referred to here was the false argument that the anti-
war movement was ‘anti-American’, and believed that John Howard was merely
following Washington’s line. By highlighting Australia’s mildly critical comments
at the time of America’s refusal to join international efforts to enforce an
international ban on biological weapons in 2001, Steketee suggested that
Australia was truly independent and, by implication, that support for the war
against Iraq was good policy. The piece is in the style of friendly advice to the US,
which country Steketee argued would be ‘more convincing’ in its arguments
about the necessity of war if it would ‘participate in international arms control’ of
biological weapons.
A quandary for Australia’s official Opposition
The leader of the official political opposition, Simon Crean of the Australian
Labor Party (ALP) found it tough going to differentiate himself from John
Howard while maintaining credibility in the eyes of the United States. The
American Ambassador to Canberra, Bush’s fellow oil magnate Tom Schiffer, had
weighed into domestic politics when an outspoken Labor MP had attacked
Howard’s subservience to American interests.
As the head of the ‘alternative’ government, and a key supporter of the Labor
Prime Minister, Paul Keating when he committed Australia to the first Gulf War,
Crean had difficulty maintaining any credibility with voters as he flopped around
this time. The key issue that continued to plague Crean throughout the conflict
was his attitude towards Australian forces once they were committed to battle.
Crean had initially called for the troops on ‘pre-deployment’ to be brought home
– a central demand of the anti-war movement. But
his support for this position was lukewarm, and totally compromised once the
fighting began. At that point Crean buckled and said he did support the troops.
The government was delighted at Crean’s discomfort and, of course, it became a
major issue in the media. According to columnist Matt Price (2003a) Crean had
delivered ‘mixed messages … perplexing anyone still inclined to listen to him’, and
was ‘flummoxed as bombs pepper Baghdad’.
First strike: Shock & Awe
Immediately the fighting actually got under way (as opposed to twelve years of
bombing raids on soft Iraqi targets), broadcast network news presenters set a
poor tone for the coverage that followed. On the first Saturday (22 March) some
newsreaders were smiling and almost cheering ‘our first strike’ on Iraqi targets: a
bombing mission by an Australian FA18 and some ship-to-shore fire at the Al
Faw peninsula.
In the first few days there was plenty of patriotic footage and novelty stuff from
the front of tanks. The Weekend Australian (22 March) blared ‘PUNCH INTO
IRAQ’ over front page stories about the military action (Eccleston 2003a), and
an opinion poll showed support for the war was ‘growing’ (Shanahan 2003a).
The key element of the Australian‘s front page was a carefully staged photograph
of the Iraqi soldier being given water while an assault rifle is aimed at his head
and his hands are bound. This image was also on the front page of the Sydney
Morning Herald the same day (Saturday 22 March).
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While the Australian media’s appetite for the ‘our troops in action’ type of stories
was satisfied by an easing of restrictions, the main game was still ‘the Coalition’s’
confidence and apparent lack of resistance by Iraqi forces.
The American propaganda offensive
The second day coverage in the Weekend Australian reported American concerns
that the Iraqis would begin setting fire to oil wells; ‘Fears of a new scorched
earth’ (Browne 2003a). It was another opportunity to quote further from the
briefing by Donald Rumsfeld, this time to the effect that, by setting fire to oil
wells, Saddam Hussein was ‘destroying the riches of the Iraqi people’ (Rumsfeld
quoted in Browne 2003a). On the same page Hussein is labelled a ‘master of
propaganda’ and a White House briefing paper, ‘Apparatus of Lies’, was
summarised without criticism, repeating the standard line from Washington:
that Hussein was responsible for diverting food aid into ‘weapons programs and
luxuries for himself’ and lying to the Arab world (Kerin 2003a). Throughout the
military campaign, the Australian repeated these justifications almost daily.
Operation Mushroom: We can finally tell you about it
On that first weekend, the ABC’s correspondent in Qatar, Peter Lloyd,
unwittingly let the cat out of the bag on that first week-end of fighting: the
coalition forces were also conducting ‘Operation Mushroom’ against the media.
(They keep you in the dark and they feed you bullshit, to decode this for our
American readers.) In a frank exchange with Insiders host Barry Cassidy, Lloyd
told of his frustration and that of the hundreds of reporters at the alliance
military command centre in Qatar. They were getting no information, the
briefings were sporadic, and most of what they were sending out in hourly
crosses had actually been fed to them via fax, email and Internet links from their
home bases.
From very early on in the conflict, Australian reporters complained about the
lack of access to and information from their own national military sources. The
Australian‘s staffer in Qatar, Rory Callinan complained in print about being
‘cocooned from reality by the coalition’s public relations machine’. In an obvious
shot across the bows of military PR, Callinan is described as ‘locked into the
multimillion dollar press centre… “press conference central” as he calls it.’
Callinan tells the paper that the press corps is unhappy: “We are a bit like
mushrooms here, being drip fed information” (Australian 2003a). In the first few
days this was a constant complaint from the media compound at Camp Doha.
More importantly, the appearance of this brief piece signalled the emergence of a
new genre of war stories, news and commentary on the media’s broader role.
However, it must be said that the complaints from Qatar and Canberra regarding
the lack of Australian information were not the harbinger of some nascent anti-
war sentiment among the news hacks. It was really a plea for more colour and
background material to fill out the coverage and encourage a sense of Australian
public ‘ownership’ of the conflict. From very early on, there was coverage of what
Australian forces were doing, including frigates ‘in hunt for fleeing cronies’ (Kerin
2003b).
Further attention was drawn to the media’s role by Ashleigh Wilson’s story (22
March) about war coverage and comment on the Internet: ‘Conflict comes to a
PC near you’ (Wilson A. 2003a).
The Australian media wanted more information about what Australian forces
were doing. In the second week, the Australian military PR operation began to
allow reporters to visit ships in the Gulf on search missions and mine clearing
(Kerin 2003b). One ABC news crew was allowed to ‘embed’ with Marines as they
entered Baghdad. On the other side, Australian journalists operating behind Iraqi
lines were confined to Baghdad and some expelled. Ian McPhedran and other
News Limited reporters were confined to a Baghdad hotel. McPhedran was also
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briefly accused of spying for the allies.
‘Operation Mushroom’ was not only going on close to the war-zone. On the
home front, too, the fog of war descended quickly on that first weekend. As we
sat in our homes, to watch the war unfold on television was like being carpet-
bombed with expert opinion. Most commentators were pro-war, and very few
anti-war or pro-peace voices were seen or heard. 
On that first Saturday night, one of Australia’s most respected television
journalists Kerry O’Brien hosted discussion and analysis segments within an
extended 90 minute ABC news bulletin. He had three experts – each with close
ties to the military establishment – to discuss the unfolding ‘battle for Baghdad’.
O’Brien got three of four goes at discussing this issue with these battle-hardened
experts and not much difference of opinion either. These discussions were
ephemeral and surreal – ‘Coalition’ forces were still 200 kilometres away from
the Iraqi capital. What about the political fallout in Washington, London and
Canberra from this unpopular war? In the Weekend Australian we were told that
the Coalition of the willing was growing, but the list of nations who had publicly
signed up was very light-on (Eccleston 2003c). What about the millions globally
who were still opposed to the war, despite the saturation propaganda coverage in
the Murdoch media and the half-hearted attempts by other networks?
Covering the anti-war rallies
On the main television bulletins on the first Saturday (22 March), the huge peace
rallies held around the nation and globally got very short shrift. At most, in a 90-
minute bulletin, the peace activists got a couple of short vox-pops and the
marches were mentioned. But they were bracketed with the violence of some
protest actions in the Middle East: guilt by association.
In fact the Channel 7 reporter in Brisbane sounded disappointed that there had
been ‘scuffles, but no arrests’ at that morning’s rally and sit-in. On the other
commercial stations the same thing happened. There’s a formula for covering
political demonstrations and if there’s no strong violence – usually from the
police – they don’t rate much of a mention. The issue – in this case a very serious
war – does not rate any mention. This approach is typified by a small piece in the
Murdoch-owned Courier-Mail in Brisbane about an anti-war rally in Adelaide on
14 March
. The story was headlined ‘Eggs, tomatoes fly in Adelaide protest’ (Courier-Mail
2003a), it was only eight pars and the ‘missiles’ are mentioned in four of them:
1  par: ‘demonstrators threw eggs and tomatoes at … Howard’s car’;
2  par: ‘one protestor was taken into custody after charging at a
Commonwealth vehicle containing Mr Howard”
3  par: ‘Earlier … protesters pelted Mr Howard’s car with eggs and tomatoes’;
4  par: ‘One egg hit the rear window of the vehicle containing Mr Howard’;
5  par: ‘Demonstrators chanting anti-war slogans and carrying placards were
kept about 15m from Mr Howard by South Australian police’;
6  par: ‘despite the police barrier, protesters pelted three Commonwealth
vehicles with eggs and tomatoes’;
7  par: ‘The protesters then left [the scene]‘;
8  par: ‘When he left, one protester broke police ranks, charged at the vehicle
containing Mr Howard, and appeared to throw something. No charge was laid.’
Apart from one mention of ‘anti-war slogans’ this item did not say anything










incidents: the ‘eggs and tomatoes’ thrown at the car and one person running at
‘the vehicle containing Mr Howard’. This is a typical ‘news’ report of the anti-war
protests – and the ‘deviant’ nature of the smaller actions, such as confronting
John Howard in Adelaide, is then applied to the movement as a whole. This
technique was also reinforced by the way demonstrations were reported on
television.
The local peace rallies were always covered by long-distance camera, a few
anonymous shots of the crowds, a couple of colourful banners perhaps and, on a
slow news day, a grab from one of the speakers. The rallies overseas were most
often covered with a reader voice over that gave bare facts and, where possible,
focussed the shots on ‘disturbances’, the question of ‘violence’ was never quite
resolved, but the clear implication was that it was caused by the protesters.
Why didn’t the news directors and editors – with their endless hours of coverage
to fill – get some pro-peace experts into the studio to discuss their point of view?
Instead of any analysis of the politics of the peace movement, most newspaper
columnists joined the attack on their credibility and spokesfigures. Where were
the newspaper columns for anti-war activists to make their case? Even if the
usually unreliable Newspoll in the Weekend Australian (Shanahan 2003a) was
right, that first weekend after bombing began at best support for the war was still
a 50-50 proposition. Surely, in the interests of balance and fairness, the anti-war
arguments should have been put in front of people so that they could continue to
make up their own minds.
There was no chance of that happening: from the moment of the first missile
strike on that elusive ‘target of opportunity’, Saddam Hussein, the Australian
news media and opinion-leaders became more pro-war. Once the war started
there was a violent shift in the political attitudes of the police and most politicians
towards the anti-war marches. This was particularly aimed at students and
young people, and the police were egged on by the talkback rant-jocks.
How the mood was shifted
Public sentiment in Australia was overwhelmingly against the war. The anti-war
marches were the biggest Australian mobilisations since Vietnam, and almost
certainly the largest political demonstrations ever in Australia. More people were
on the streets over a sustained period than during the anti-conscription
mobilisations of World War One and it was certainly vastly bigger than the
Vietnam moratorium. The marchers were a cross-section of ordinary Australians
from every ethnic and religious background. There was a sense of purpose and
strength in the crowds, and the sentiment was way to the left of the official Labor
leadership. In Brisbane the Labor leader, Simon Crean was booed when he
addressed the crowd of about 80,000. His right-wing position of support for an
attack on Iraq if it was ‘legitimate’ and UN-backed was very unpopular.
The anti-war movement was also growing politically and intellectually. Sales of
left-wing literature and paraphernalia were huge. Radical speakers got the
loudest cheers and many people participated in illegal street occupations to hold
‘speak-outs’ against the war. On at least four occasions in Brisbane we held up
downtown traffic for several hours during busy shopping periods. Church groups,
green and peace groups worked with the various Left groups and unions to build
the anti-war rallies. High school students mobilised in impressive numbers in all
major cities. Spontaneous walkouts, some supported by parents and the teachers’
unions, saw several large student actions. As the war got closer, the news media’s
attitude to the peace movement changed. The NSW police signalled a tough
stand against student demonstrations and warned parents not to let their children
get involved with anarchists and violent young men of a certain ethnic
background. This policing action also sent a strong signal to the media that the
gloves were off, that the peace movement was no longer a ‘good’ news story.
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Some journalists oppose the war
It would be unfair to characterise the Australian news media as solidly pro-war.
Some, like Canberra Times editor in chief, Jack Waterford, made their opposition
clear, as did Sydney Morning Herald online political editor Margo Kingston.
Some, such as Australian columnist Matt Price, held to a diminishing middle
ground of critical distance and criticised their journalist colleagues:
Millions of Australians are despairing at this war. We want it to end quickly, even
if this elevates Howard to short-term heroism and makes his slavish media cheer
squad even more unbearable than usual. (Price 2003a)
But once the war had begun, comments like this were read as support for keeping
Australian troops there.
Lies, propaganda and deliberate misinformation are to be expected in all wars. As
British journalist and author Phillip Knightley says, the use of public information
as a weapon of war is an honoured tactic of presidents and generals. Only rarely
do working journalists, particularly senior ones, acknowledge this openly;
although many will say so quietly at dinner parties or in the bar after hours. One
rare editor in this category is Waterford whose leader in the Canberra Times, (5
April) detailed the countless lies we were told by ‘our’ ‘own’ side. He noted how
western journalists had been lied to about some events – the outcome of battles,
the numbers of POWs, how civilian deaths had occurred at checkpoints. He also
pointed out the deceptions in the Jessica Lynch incident, but pessimistically added
that, in propaganda terms, when the truth finally came out some time later it
didn’t really matter.
Surely the fact that the truth will usually emerge, often only in a day or so, might
make some soldiers and politicians less willing to lie? Not necessarily, it would
seem, if it serves some immediate purpose. (Waterford 2003a)
A direct propaganda hit on the news media won on the day in the Private Lynch
affair and, by the next day, there was a new outrage, atrocity or allied victory to
take its place.
The Australian news media shared the pleasure of the allied ‘victory’ in Iraq and
carried most of the same packaged material seen everywhere. The toppling of the
statue; the waving and smiling crowds, the seeming celebration of Saddam’s
overthrow. However, it was interesting to note how quickly this soured and how
quickly we began to see cracks appearing in the ‘Coalition’ rhetoric.
Conclusions
It’s clear, and hardly surprising, that Rupert Murdoch’s Australian led the
patriotic media brigades in Austr
alia during Gulf War Two. On the other side of the ledger, the Sydney Morning
Herald and the Canberra Times both editorialised against Australian
involvement in the anti-Saddam coalition. Cutting through what the popular
press took to calling the ‘fog of war’ (as if that simple phrase told us everything
we needed to know) was very difficult.
Just as in Gulf War One, the American military had total control both of the air
above Iraq and of the airwaves. The briefings gave us more enhanced images of
smart bombs, trucks exploding under bridges and cruise missiles launched
dramatically from the safety of the US fleet. But we also saw much more
intensive footage of the fighting, and this too impacted on the language of the
war. Like the Australian television newsreader who excitedly reported that ‘our’
fighters had had a ‘productive’ day in the battlefield. Or the one who smiled when
announcing the RAAF had dropped its ‘first’ bomb – as if it were a birth or
something to celebrate.
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Everything it seems was more bloody and extreme in Gulf War Two. The
embedded media also showed us some horrible stuff. Dead, wounded prisoners of
war, bombed homes, a firestorm over Baghdad, civilians dying in hospitals.
British journalist John Simpson and his party were strafed by the US air force.
An Iraqi civilian was killed and we saw blood dripping on the camera lens as it
was carried along by a wounded journalist. We saw three civilians in Baghdad
shot as their car tried to overtake an army truck in which an ABC crew was
embedded. In the new language of this war, these things became commonplace.
They shocked us momentarily, but then a relentless and more subtle language of
war took over.
The tone of the Australian‘s coverage was, of course, a more purposeful, yet less
obvious form of propaganda: ‘the big lie’, that which conforms most closely with
what politicians like to call a general ‘common sense’ approach. It is a lie so big,
so monstrous, that those in power like to pretend it doesn’t exist. It is an
ideological appeal to nationalism, patriotism and the myth of free markets and
democracy. It is a lie because what it offered – so-called ‘western liberal
democracy’ as the solution for Iraq and as the moral force behind the invasion —
is itself a lie. The Australian and other Murdoch papers churned out and spun
this lie for all it was worth. The alternative is never mentioned and so the lie
appears to be the only possible version of the truth.
In Australia, the most proficient exponents of this ‘black art’ work for the
Murdoch press. The most recent suggestion from this quarter is that the
Australian federal model of government might be appropriate in post-war Iraq.
It has already been taken further up the flagpole by Howard, and many others
are lining up to salute. Of course, no one mentions the mess in East Timor in this
context following a similar operation to bring peace, stability, democracy and the
free market to an oppressed people.
In the same linguistic frame is the snarling, sneering and sometimes vicious
response that the more radical elements of the peace movement provoked from
Murdoch columnists and news reporters. The offensive commentators of the far
right who inhabit Murdoch’s papers like a large tumour took great delight in
personally attacking their political opponents. The ‘chardonnay socialist’ slur with
variants was put to constant use to the point of complete boredom for the reader.
Side-stepping the political argument to take the cheap shot appeared to be their
only rhetorical style.
This open hostility from the columnists then emboldened the news writers to take
on a sharper tone. The coverage of the Sydney student protests (March 27) in the
Murdoch press was a clear example. A front page story in the Australian accused
the student left of being racist. The Murdoch-owned Sydney tabloid Daily
Telegraph had a front page banner: ‘The Face of Hate’ – sure to stir up readers
and inflame racial violence. At the same time they quoted with glee, and plenty
of repetition, the comment from the NSW police that young men of ‘Middle-
Eastern’ appearance had been looking for a fight. The police claimed to have
found knives, they charged a few people and they provoked a fight. A good day’s
work for the NSW police service, and duly reported as such. It took over a week
for anyone to actually talk to the young people involved from south-west Sydney.
I must add, it wasn’t the Murdoch papers.
The point is a very simple one: once you demonise the enemy and make your
opponents deviant in terms of the ‘commonsense’ approach, the use of force is
legitimised. This technique was applied to the military enemy – Iraq – and to
those who dared to oppose the war at home.
Saddam Hussein’s followers were constantly referred to as the ‘fedayeen’, they
were ‘thugs’, they were vicious and criminal. This approach from the opinion
writers and columnists justified the attacks and the killing, even though,
according to these same apologists, any death in war is ‘regrettable’. At home, the
effect was the same: peace activists were derided as the loony-left, the ‘peaceniks’,
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or worse, manipulative communist cells operating clandestinely.
Young working class students and teenagers from Sydney’s southwest, angry
about the war and clearly against it, were stereotyped as ‘hotheads’, thugs, and
‘unAustralian’. They were different, their Arabness, not their Australian identity
was what the pro-war press emphasised.
In both cases – the Iraqi regime and Australian protestors – the media tended to
fall back onto racist stereotypes. And counterposed to this was the so-called
‘national interest’. Of course the ‘national interest’ argument was bolstered and
defended vigorously by the media’s unquestioning acceptance of so-called
‘operational security’, and the line that all Australians should express ‘support for
our troops’ (because they were there whatever we might have thought about the
war).
It is easy to target and get angry about the obvious linguistic tricks of war –
‘friendly fire’; ‘smart bombs’; ‘unfortunate’ civilian deaths; the callous disregard
for basic human rights and outright lies. It’s not so easy to unpick the more
embedded language. Gulf War Two was an imperialist war and the American
state continues to be driven by a desire for world domination. Britain and
Australia went along because they stand to benefit economically and politically
from American strength. This war was a dangerous and unpredictable beginning
to a new age of imperialist conflict. At the heart of this is the ageing and barbaric
capitalist system.
Many Iraqi people know that. The language on their side began changing too, in
the aftermath of the fighting. At one of the first anti-American protests in
Baghdad, we were allowed to see the crowd shouting: ‘Yankee go home’.
Attempts to ‘rebuild’ Iraq are also creating new twists in the language of war and
conflict. Words like ‘democratic’, ‘representative’, ‘elected’ have become important
and there will be a fight over their meaning too. How long before we see Iraqi
‘police’ shooting Iraqis, backed by American tanks? How will they explain that
away?
I think that at home there’s been a certain amount of ‘shock and awe’. In the
peace movement there was an air of despair following what appeared to be a
quick American victory. This war was ‘over’ quite quickly and it appeared that
the Americans were so powerful that they could not be stopped.
I don’t think we should get too pessimistic. Months later Iraq is not secure and
the Iraqi people have had a small taste of freedom. They will not be in a hurry to
give that up to Chalabi or anyone else.
The American regime is likely to press on. We could see more wars break out and
policing actions stepped up. Perhaps more bombing raids on Syria, possibly by the
Israelis. The Arab-speaking world will be angry that their gove
rnments colluded with American imperialism. There’s more to come.
The other important thing to remember is that in terms of global public opinion,
the small majorities who supported the war– after the event, but not before – in
America, Britain and Australia are still a minority.
The peace movement is in a strong position to rebuild when this thing goes
wrong, or when the Americans decide on their next attack on some pretext or
other. We too have developed our ideas and our language of war and peace. A
significant and large group of people became active over the months of the build-
up to war and during the conflict. Many of the newly politicised are students still
in high school. It is among this layer that a group of politically active and
knowledgeable leaders of the future peace movement will emerge. Through
exposure to new ideas and to political activity this group will begin to develop
new and relevant arguments about the big questions of the day. A new
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generation will cut through the fog of war. A new wave will articulate their own
language of resistance and liberation.
Throughout the period of the fighting, support for war increased in the
combatant nations: the USA, the UK and Australia. This was perhaps to be
expected for fairly obvious reasons; not least of which is the role of the news
media in popularising the war and dulling some sensibilities.
There can be no doubt that the Murdoch press played an important role in
cohering what support there was for Australia’s involvement in Gulf War Two.
On the other hand, in terms of global public opinion, the pro-war group in
Australia continues to be insignificant. And it’s by no means solidly behind either
the war, or the leadership of Prime Minister Howard. Peace and stability in Iraq
any time soon is still a risky proposition. Public opinion in other nations – Russia,
France, Germany, throughout the Middle East – is solidly against the American
occupation of Iraq. Already we have seen how problematic this can be for the
‘Coalition’.
Now there’s more resistance to the American occupation and talk of it extending
for months or even years more to come. The political climate is beginning to shift
again. The fact that several major Australian media organisations didn’t fall in
compliantly with the line of the Australian government points to significant
fractures inside the ruling class and its leadership. This will continue to open up
space for oppositional voices, both in the press and on the streets.
Dr Martin Hirst is a lecturer in the School of Journalism &
Communication at the University of Queensland <m.hirst@uq.edu.au>
1. 2003a. Before the fight, the contracts. Australian, 13 March, 7.
2. 2003a. OPEC to keep oil flowing. Australian, 13 March, 7.
3. Australian. 2003a. Journalists kept in dark. Weekend Australian, 22-23
March, 2.
4. —2003b. French toast irrelevant UN. Australian, 13 March, 10.
5. Australian, Weekend. 2002. UN must take tough action against Iraq.
Weekend Australian, 12 October, 18.
6. Bremner, Charles. 2003a. Chirac’s defiance earns national hero status.
Australian, 13 March, 8.
7. Browne, Anthony. 2003a. Fears of a new scorched earth. Weekend
Australian, 22-23 March, 4.
8. Courier-Mail. 2003a. Eggs, tomatoes fly in Adelaide protest. Courier-Mail,
15 March, 4.
9. Paul. 2003a. Loud, and carrying a big stick. Weekend Australian, 22-23
March, 11.
10. Eccleston, Roy. 2003a. Allies race to key port. Weekend Australian, 22-23
March, 1.
11. —2003b. Sidelined UN more relevant than ever. Weekend Australian, 22-23
March, 9.
12. —2003c. Coalition building says Bush. Weekend Australian, 22-23 March,
6.
13. Kerin, John. 2003a. Dark arts of a master of propaganda. Weekend
Australian, 22-23 March, 4.
14. —2003b. Frigates in hunt for fleeing cronies. Weekend Australian, 22-23
March, 4.
15. Lusetich, Robert. 2003a. Get off the fence, orders Bush. Australian, 13
March, 1.
16. McIlveen, Luke. 2003a. Security analyst dismisses damage control bid.
Australian, 13 March, 6.
17. Price, Matt. 2003a. Bungler of Baghdad digs in for a long war. Weekend
Australian, 22-23 March, 40.
18. Reuters, London. 2003a. Labour havoc unleashes the doves of Blair.
Australian, 13 March, 8.
19. Shanahan, Dennis. 2003a. Support for war growing. Weekend Australian,
converted by Web2PDFConvert.com
Powered by  WordPress. Built on the Thematic Theme Framework.
« Ian Reyes, Music Between Performance
and Plasticit
The Generalist versus the Professionalist —
Jonathan Scott »
This entry was posted in Miscellaneous and edition 2003 Issue 4 . Bookmark the
permalink. Both comments and trackbacks are currently closed.
22-23 March, 1, 7.
20. —2003c. Howard called in to help White House. Australian, 13 March, 1, 6.
21. Sheridan, Greg. 2003a. UN power play cannot effect war’s morality.
Australian, 13 March, 11.
22. —2003b. Americans try to psych rational opponent. Weekend Australian,
22-23 March, 11.
23. Steketee, Mike. 2003a. Buck the conventions. Weekend Australian, 22-23
March, 40.
24. Sutherland, Tracy. 2003a. Council minnows resisting tug of war.
Australian, 13 March, 8.
25. Ullman, Harlan. 2003a. Pillars of security shaking. Weekend Australian,
22-23 March, 11.
26. Walbran, Tony. 2003. Crisis calls for full vote of General Assembly.
Australian, 13 March, 10.
27. Walters, Patrick. 2003b. Strategic alliance system ‘in decay’. Australian, 13
March, 6.
28. Waterford, Jack. 2003. Yes, they would like to talk to you (online edition of
Canberra Times) [Internet]. Canberra Times 2003a [cited 11 April 2003].
Available from canberra.yourguide.com.au/.
29. Wilson A., Ashleigh. 2003a. Conflict comes to a PC near you. Weekend
Australian, 22-23 March, 4.
converted by Web2PDFConvert.com
